Abstract Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are security primitives that exploit intrinsic random physical variations of hardware components. In the recent years, many security solutions based on PUFs have been proposed, including identification/authentication schemes, key storage and hardware-entangled cryptography. Existing PUF instantiations typically exhibit a static challenge/response behavior, while many practical applications would benefit from reconfigurable PUFs. Examples include the revocation or update of "secrets" in PUF-based key storage or cryptographic primitives based on PUFs. In this paper, we present the concept of logically reconfigurable PUFs (LR-PUFs) that allow changing the challenge/response behavior without physically replacing or modifying the underlying PUF. We present two efficient LR-PUF constructions and evaluate their performance and security. In this context, we introduce a formal security model for LR-PUFs. Finally, we discuss several practical applications of LR-PUFs focusing on lightweight solutions for resource-constrained embedded devices, in particular RFIDs.
Introduction
The rapid evolution of information technology has drastically changed the shape of information systems. Computing devices are becoming increasingly smaller and highly distributed. Moreover, embedded computing platforms such as smartphones and sensors undergo a rapid development becoming progressively more sophisticated with regard to their computational, storage and interface capabilities. At the same time, the growing popularity and widespread use of these systems, along with the fact that they are increasingly deployed to process and store privacy-sensitive and securitycritical data, make them attractive targets for different kinds of software and hardware attacks. In particular, resourceconstrained embedded devices, such as RFIDs, are typically vulnerable to physical attacks.
In this context, Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) promise a cost-efficient alternative to existing hardware protection mechanisms. PUFs enable unique device identification and authentication (see, e.g., [43, 45, 47, 55] ), binding software and hardware components to devices (see, e.g., [10, 16, 17, 23] ), secure storage of, e.g., cryptographic secrets (see, e.g., [32, 58] ), and can be directly integrated into cryptographic algorithms [3] and remote attestation protocols [49] .
Today, there are already some PUF-based security products aimed for the market, including RFID, IP-protection and anticounterfeiting solutions [20, 57] .
Existing PUF implementations typically exhibit a static challenge/response behavior, while many practical applications would benefit from reconfigurable PUFs, whose challenge/response behavior can be dynamically changed, i.e., reconfigured, after deployment. For instance, applications of PUF-based key storage [32, 58] and PUF-based cryptographic primitives [3] may require revoking or updating previous secrets derived from the PUF, which could be easily realized with a reconfigurable PUF. Another example are solutions to prevent downgrading of software by binding the software to a certain hardware configuration [10, 25] . Moreover, when PUF-based wireless access tokens (see, e.g., [43, 45, 47, 55, 57] ) are re-used/recycled, the new users of the token shall not be able to retrieve access rights and/or to obtain privacy-sensitive information of the previous users of the token (see, e.g., [4, 21, 59] ).
However, all known implementations of physically reconfigurable PUFs rely on optical mechanisms, reconfigurable hardware (i.e., FPGAs), or novel memory technologies [25] , which all have serious drawbacks in practice. In particular, optical PUFs cannot be easily integrated into standard integrated circuits and often require expensive and error-prone evaluation equipment, while FPGA-based solutions cannot be realized with non-reconfigurable hardware (i.e., ASICs) that is commonly used in practice [35] . In this context, several attempts to emulate physically reconfigurable PUFs have been made. One of the first proposals in this direction was integrating a floating gate transistor into the delay lines of an arbiter PUF, which allows physically changing the challenge/response behavior of the PUF based on a logical state maintained in non-volatile memory [31] . Other approaches restrict access to the interface of the PUF and use part of the PUF challenge to emulate reconfigurability [25, 32] , which, however, works only for PUFs with a large challenge space.
Our goal and contributions
In this paper, we present the concept of logically reconfigurable PUFs (LR-PUFs), a practical alternative to physically reconfigurable PUFs. LR-PUFs amend a PUF with a stateful control logic that changes the challenge/response behavior of the LR-PUF according to its internal logical state without physically replacing or modifying the underlying PUF. 1 We present and evaluate two different constructions for LR-PUFs. The results of our performance measurements show that the implementation overhead of the logical reconfiguration on top of a physical PUF is rather small. Further, we introduce a formal security model for LR-PUFs and prove that our constructions are secure. More precisely, we show that, when instantiated by an appropriate PUF under reasonable assumptions, our LR-PUFs can achieve both forward-and backward-unpredictability: The former assures that responses measured before the reconfiguration event are invalid thereafter, while the latter assures that an adversary with access to a reconfigured PUF cannot estimate the PUF behavior before reconfiguration. Finally, we demonstrate how LR-PUFs could be deployed for re-usable (recyclable) access tokens, such as electronic transit tickets, and discuss other envisaged applications of LR-PUFs. Note that, although the constructions of LR-PUFs as proposed in this paper seem to be similar to controlled PUFs [13] , they have very different objectives: In contrast to controlled PUFs, LRPUFs do not aim to prevent modeling attacks on PUFs but provide a practical way to enable reconfigurability for existing, typically static PUF constructions. We will elaborate on this aspect in Sect. 3.
Outline
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: After providing background information on PUFs in Sect. 2, we present the concept of LR-PUFs in Sect. 3. We show two concrete LR-PUF constructions in Sect. 4, describe their implementation and evaluate their performance in Sect. 5, and formally prove their security in Sect. 6. In Sect. 7, we show how LR-PUFs could be used to realize recyclable access tokens and discuss several other potential use cases of LR-PUFs. Finally, we conclude in Sect. 8.
Background: PUFs
A PUF is a noisy function that is embedded into a physical object, e.g., an integrated circuit [2, 44] . When queried with a challenge w, a PUF generates a response y ← PUF(w) that depends on both w and the unique device-specific intrinsic physical properties of the object containing PUF(). Since PUFs are subject to noise (e.g., environmental variations), they return slightly different responses when queried with the same challenge multiple times.
In literature, PUFs are typically assumed to be robust, physically unclonable, unpredictable and tamper evident, and several approaches to heuristically quantify and formally define their properties have been proposed (see [2] for a comprehensive overview). Robustness means that, when queried with the same challenge multiple times, the same PUF will always return the same response. Physical unclonability means that it is infeasible to physically produce two PUFs that cannot be distinguished based on their challenge/response behavior, which cannot be achieved by (cryptographic) algorithms. Unpredictability requires that it is infeasible to predict the PUF response to a given, previously unknown challenge, even if the PUF can be adaptively queried for a certain number of times. Since this is the most interesting property for cryptographic applications of PUFs (see, e.g., [2, 3, 35] ), we will formally define unpredictability later, when we prove the security of our LR-PUF constructions. Tamper evidence means that any attempt to physically access the PUF irreversibly changes its challenge/response behavior. This is an important issue for practical deployment since it allows the detection of invasive hardware attacks, to which embedded devices are typically exposed to in practice.
A broad variety of different PUF constructions exists (see [35] for an overview). The most appealing ones for integration into electronic circuits are electronic PUFs. The most prominent examples of electrical PUFs include delay-based PUFs that exploit race conditions (arbiter PUFs [28, 33, 43] ) and frequency variations (ring oscillator PUFs [14, 36, 54] ) that can be found in integrated circuits; memory-based PUFs that are based on the instability of volatile memory cells such as SRAM [18, 19] , flip-flops [29, 34] and latches [24, 53] ; and coating PUFs [56] , which are based on the capacitance caused by a special dielectric coating applied to the chip that houses the PUF.
Note that the number of unique responses of a memorybased PUF is limited by the number of its memory cells. Moreover, it has been shown that most delay-based PUFs are subject to model building attacks that allow simulating the PUF in software (see, e.g., [28, 33, 43, 46] ). To counter this problem, additional primitives must be used: controlled PUFs [13] use cryptography in hardware to hide the actual response of the underlying PUF, which prevents model building attacks. This requires the link between the PUF and the crypto component as well as the crypto component itself to be protected against invasive and side channel attacks.
Logically reconfigurable PUFs
A logically reconfigurable PUF (LR-PUF) is a PUF whose challenge/response behavior depends on both the physical properties of the PUF and the logical state maintained by a control logic. The challenge/response behavior of the LR-PUF can be dynamically changed after it has been deployed by updating its state.
System model
An LR-PUF combines a conventional PUF and a control logic circuit. As shown in Fig. 1 , the control logic maintains a state S, which is stored in non-volatile memory, and provides an algorithm query S () for querying, and rcnf() for reconfiguring the LR-PUF. The algorithm query S () consists of an input transformation function mapin S () and an output transformation function mapout S () : query S (c) computes w ← mapin S (c), evaluates y ← PUF(w), and returns r ← mapout S (y). The algorithm implementing rcnf() reconfigures the LR-PUF by changing the current state S to a new independent state S ← rcnf().
Note that the generic LR-PUF construction depicted in Fig. 1 can be seen as a generalization of controlled PUFs [13] . Controlled PUFs aim to hide the challenge/response behavior of the underlying PUF to the adversary to prevent model building attacks [13, 46] by applying an appropriate mapin() and/or mapout() function. In contrast, LR-PUFs aim to enable reconfigurability for conventional non-reconfigurable PUFs after they have been deployed by entangling an updatable state with the challenges and/or responses of the underlying PUF.
Assumptions and adversary model
Following the common assumptions on PUFs, we assume that the underlying PUF of the LR-PUF is physically Fig. 1 Generic logically reconfigurable PUF construction unclonable and unpredictable (see Sect. 2). Further, the algorithms mapin(), mapout() and rcnf() are publicly known. Moreover, the adversary A is assumed to know the current and all previous states S of the LR-PUF but cannot change S to a value of its choice (e.g., an old LR-PUF state).
Requirements
To prevent the adversary A from changing the LR-PUF state to a specific value, the following must be ensured: (1) rcnf() cannot be manipulated such that it generates predictable states, and (2) the non-volatile memory cells storing the LR-PUF state cannot be set to specific values (e.g., by hardware attacks). The first requirement can be achieved by implementing the reconfiguration function using a fault injection aware design at a reasonable performance penalty [1, 37] . Moreover, although fault injection attacks against non-volatile memory (e.g., EEPROM or Flash) are known [50] , it seems to be difficult in practice to perform invasive attacks that change the content of specific non-volatile memory cells without affecting the content of the surrounding cells [51] . Hence, in practice it should be infeasible for an adversary to write a specific value (e.g., an old LR-PUF state) into the non-volatile memory of the LR-PUF. In particular, due to the increasing complexity of modern embedded systems and the fact that technology nodes are progressively getting smaller, the amount of precision and the quality of the equipment required to successfully perform such attacks renders them uneconomical in most practical applications (e.g., electronic ticketing).
Security objectives
Like a conventional PUF, an LR-PUF should be robust, physically unclonable and unpredictable (see Sect. 2). In particular, it should be infeasible for the adversary A to predict the response to a challenge of an LR-PUF for a certain state, even if A knows the responses to this challenge for other (e.g., old) states. Moreover, in most applications of reconfigurable PUFs, it must be infeasible to set the state of the LR-PUF to a specific value, which would allow resetting the LR-PUF to a previous state and may help the adversary to predict LR-PUF responses.
We first informally summarize the security requirements of LR-PUFs below and later give formal definitions in Sect. 6.
• Backward unpredictability: A cannot predict the response of the LR-PUF for a previous state S (i.e., before reconfiguration) to a challenge that has not been queried for the previous state, even if A knows an adaptively chosen set of challenge/response pairs (CRPs) of the LR-PUF for the previous state and can adaptively obtain CRPs of the LR-PUF for the current state.
• Forward unpredictability: A cannot predict the response of an LR-PUF for the current state S to a challenge that has not yet been queried for the current state, even if A knows an adaptively chosen set of CRPs of the LR-PUF for the previous state and can adaptively obtain CRPs of the LR-PUF for the current state (except for the challenge in question).
• Non-resettability: A cannot set the state of the LR-PUF to a specific value.
LR-PUF constructions
In this section, we present two instantiations of our generic LR-PUF construction described in Sect. 3. The first construction is optimized for the fast generation of LR-PUF responses, while the second construction aims for the area constraints of low-cost devices and provides a trade-off between response generation time and the area size, i.e., the number of gates required.
Speed-optimized LR-PUF construction
Our first construction uses a PUF with a large challenge and a large response space and implements the control logic based on a single collision-resistant hash function. The challenge space must be large since otherwise it may be possible to create a complete challenge/response pair database, which allows emulating the PUF. A large response space is a fundamental security requirement in many applications such as PUF-based identification/authentication [32, 58] and PUFbased block-ciphers [3] , where it is crucial that the PUF response to a formerly unknown challenge can be guessed with negligible probability only.
Our first construction is shown in Algorithm 1 and works as follows: Upon query S (c), the control logic computes w ← Hash(S c) and returns y ← PUF(w). To reconfigure the LR-PUF, rcnf() sets the LR-PUF state to S ← Hash(S).
The collision-resistance property of the hash function ensures the unpredictability property of the LR-PUF (see Sect. 2), as we will show later in the formal security analysis. Note that the LR-PUF state is just used to parameterize the hash function and thus needs not to be secret. Hence, to reconfigure the LR-PUF it is sufficient to hash the previous LR-PUF state to obtain a new and independent state (assuming the hash function is collision resistant).
Most PUF constructions that support a large challenge space (e.g., arbiter PUFs [28, 33, 43] ) have only a small response space. Typically several of these PUFs are implemented and evaluated in parallel on the same challenge to generate a large number of PUF response bits in a short amount of time. However, this approach significantly increases the amount of area required for the overall PUF implementation. Hence, we propose a second, areaoptimized LR-PUF construction that can be implemented with only one single PUF with a large challenge but small response space.
Area-optimized LR-PUF construction
The intuition of our second construction is very similar to the speed-optimized construction of Sect. 4.1. However, it uses only a single PUF with a large challenge but small response space that is evaluated sequentially n times to generate an n bit LR-PUF response. While this approach increases the time required to generate a large number of PUF response bits, it requires significantly less area than the speed-optimized construction of Sect. 4.1, providing a trade-off between area consumption and response generation speed.
The underlying PUF of the LR-PUF must be sequentially queried with different challenges to generate a large number of different (and ideally) independent response bits. This can be achieved by including a counter j as additional input to the hash function that now generates a sequence of PUF challenges w j from the LR-PUF challenge c and the current LR-PUF state S. The corresponding PUF responses y j are then concatenated to form the response r of the LR-PUF.
Our second construction is depicted in Algorithm 2 and works as follows: On query S (c), the control logic of the LR-PUF computes mapin S (c) as w j ← Hash(S w j) for j ∈ {0, . . . , n}, evaluates y j ← PUF(w j ), and mapout S () finally returns r ← (y 0 . . . y n ). To reconfigure the LR-PUF, rcnf() sets the LR-PUF state to S ← Hash(S).
Implementation and performance evaluation
Both constructions presented in Sect. 4 are based on PUFs with a large challenge space. The only existing electronic PUFs that provide this feature seem to be arbiter PUFs [15, 28] . The hash function of the control logic can be implemented efficiently using a lightweight block cipher.
We implemented a prototype of both of our LR-PUF constructions on a Xilinx Spartan-6 FPGA board. We instantiated the underlying PUF based on arbiter PUFs that support 64 bit challenges and generate 1 bit responses, following the approach in [52] . The hash function of the control logic is based on the PRESENT block cipher [5] in DaviesMeyer mode [26] . Both resulting LR-PUF implementations use 80 bit challenges and generate 64 bit responses.
We evaluated our implementation with regard to response generation speed and area consumption. Our results are summarized in Table 1 . The second column shows the time in number of clock cycles required to compute an LR-PUF response r. The remaining columns show the number of slices and gate equivalents (GE) required to implement the control logic, the PUF and the overall construction. The area estimation does not include the non-volatile memory for storing the LR-PUF state, which cannot be implemented on FPGA. Our results show that the area-optimized construction requires only about 10% of the area of the speed-optimized construction but is 60 times slower.
Note that our implementation is meant to demonstrate the feasibility of our approach and to obtain performance results. Due to the technical constraints of FPGAs, our implementation does not cover the non-volatile memory for storing the LR-PUF state, which is emulated by providing the state as an input to the FPGA. A secure implementation of our constructions must be based on PUFs providing the unpredictability property (see Sect. 2). The only known PUFs that have this property seem to be controlled PUFs [13] . A typical controlled PUF prevents model building attacks by hashing the response [13] of its underlying PUF, which hides the response from the adversary [46] . Since PUF responses are noisy, some form of error correction (e.g., a fuzzy extractor [9] ) must be applied to the PUF response before it is hashed. Note that our LR-PUF construction already includes a hash function that could also be used for the controlled PUF. Therefore, only the error correction mechanism must be implemented when building an LR-PUF based on a controlled PUF. Moreover, the non-volatile memory and control logic should be protected against fault-injection attacks, e.g., by applying the techniques described in [1, 37] .
Security definitions and evaluation
In this section we formally define the LR-PUF security properties of forward-and backward-unpredictability and show that both are fulfilled by the constructions proposed in Sect. 4.
To this end, we first formalize the security property of unpredictability of a standard PUF. Along the lines of [2] , we define unpredictability of a PUF in terms of an unpredictability game between an adversary A and a challenger C. A is first given a PUF and is allowed to query it at most q times. This step allows to model adversaries that are able to learn CRPs either by direct physical access to the interface of the PUF or by eavesdropping on messages containing PUF challenges and responses. At the end of the game, A is required to output a (non-trivial) valid pair of a PUF challenge and response.
Unpredictability game of a PUF
• Setup: The challenger C issues the PUF to the adversary A.
• Queries: Proceeding adaptively, A queries the PUF at most q times on challenges w i (1 ≤ i ≤ q). For each query, y i ← PUF(w i ) is given to A. • Output: Finally, A outputs a CRP (w * , y * ).
Let Q denote the set of all challenges issued by A. We say that A wins the game, if y * is a valid PUF response to PUF(w * ) and w * ∈ Q. Conversely, a PUF is unpredictable, if no efficient adversary A is able to win the game with significant success probability: Definition 1 A PUF is (q, ε)-unpredictable, if no probabilistic polynomial time adversary A that makes at mostueries to the LR-PUF can win the unpredictability game with a probability greater than ε.
Next, we define backward-and forward-unpredictability of an LR-PUF in terms of a two-stage game between an adversary A and a challenger C. In the first stage, A is given oracle access (i.e., access to the interface) of the LR-PUF, from which A can obtain CRPs at will. This stage models the ability of A to obtain challenges and responses (with respect to a fixed internal LR-PUF state) by passive eavesdropping. We also give A access to the internal LR-PUF state to model hardware attacks against the LR-PUF implementation. Once A has learned enough CRPs, the challenger performs the reconfiguration operation and finally gives A oracle access to the reconfigured LR-PUF such that A can obtain CRPs of the reconfigured LR-PUF. At the end of the game, A outputs a prediction (c * , r * ) of an LR-PUF CRP.
More formally, A = (A L , A C ) consists of two probabilistic polynomial time algorithms, where A L interacts with the LR-PUF before reconfiguration and A C thereafter. A engages in the following experiment:
Backward-and forward-unpredictability game of an LR-PUF
• Setup: The challenger C sets up an LR-PUF by choosing a random state S, which is given to the adversary
up to q L times. At the end of phase I, A L stops and outputs a log file st that is used as input to A C . We denote with Q L the set of challenges issued by A L during phase I.
• Reconfiguration: C reconfigures the LR-PUF by calling rcnf(), which updates the internal LR-PUF state to S . • Phase II: A C is initialized with log file st from A L and the LR-PUF state S . A C is allowed to query the reconfigured LR-PUF query S () up to q C times on arbitrary challenges. We denote with Q C the set of challenges issued by A C during phase II.
• Output: Finally, A C outputs a CRP (c * , r * ) of the LR-PUF.
Depending on whether we consider backward-or forward-unpredictability, we can state different conditions of an adversary being successful: A wins the backward-unpredictability game if r * is a valid LR-PUF response to query S (c * ) and c * ∈ Q C . Thus, once the LR-PUF has been reconfigured, the adversary cannot output a (non-trivial) CRP for the reconfigured LR-PUF. Conversely, A wins the forward unpredictability game if r * is a valid LR-PUF response to query S (c * ) and c * ∈ Q L . Thus, an adversary, who has access to a reconfigured LR-PUF cannot predict (non-trivial) responses of the LR-PUF before reconfiguration happened. We say that an LR-PUF is backward-(resp. forward-) unpredictable, if no efficient adversary A can win the game with significant success probability: , q C , ε) -backward unpredictable (resp. forward-unpredictable), if no probabilistic polynomial time adversary A that makes at most q L queries in phase I and at most q C queries in phase II, is able to win the backward-unpredictability (resp. forward unpredictability) game with a probability greater than ε.
Both constructions of Sect. 4 achieve backward-and forward-unpredictability: 1 is (q L , q C , ε) 
In the following we only provide a proof sketch, while the detailed proofs can be found in the full version of this paper [22] .
The proofs of both propositions follow from the standard reductionist approach. In particular, we show that any adversary A against the LR-PUF can be converted into an adversary B that either breaks the collision resistance of the hash function Hash() or the unpredictability of the underlying physical PUF (Definition 1). To this end, B simulates A: Whenever A makes an LR-PUF query query S (c), B simulates the response y to this query, i.e., B computes w ← mapin S (c) using the (known) internal LR-PUF state S, evaluates the physical PUF on w and returns the obtained response y ← PUF(w) to A. Once the simulation stops, it can easily be seen that either a hash collision or a valid prediction of a CRP of the physical PUF can be extracted from A's output.
Applications

LR-PUF-based authentication tokens
Electronic payment and ticketing has been gradually introduced in many countries over the past few years (see, e.g., [7, 39, 41] ). Typically, these systems are using RFID-enabled tokens and provide different types of electronic transit tickets. Given the typically large number of tickets used in an electronic transit ticket system and the costs per token (typically between 1-3 Euros), from an economic perspective it may be worthwhile to consider recycling of RFID-based tickets. In fact, some ticketing systems (e.g., the Dutch transportation system [42]) allow recharging RFID-based tickets with money and returning used tickets to the vendor with possible restitution of preloaded money left on the ticket.
Moreover, many US and European governments make manufacturers and importers of electronic products responsible for the disposal of their products when discarded by the consumer (see, e.g., [6, 11] ). In this context, recyclable tokens can help to save waste disposal costs and to reduce the amount of electronic waste. In this section, we discuss how LR-PUFs could be used to enhance the security of electronic ticketing and payment systems while at the same time enabling secure and privacy-preserving recycling of used RFID-tickets.
There are several proprietary solutions for electronic tickets in practice. Most of them are based on widely used RFID tokens, where the most prominent example is the MiFare family produced by NXP Semiconductors [40] . There are several hard and software attacks against MiFare Classic tokens [12, 38, 48] , which use a proprietary encryption algorithm that has been completely broken [8] . However, other MiFare products are claimed not to be affected. A recent attack on MiFare Classic 4K chipcards concerns the Dutch electronic payment and transit ticket system [42]: Using a MiFare compatible card reader and a software from the Internet, an average user can add debit to his RFID-based transit ticket without being detected [30, 60] .
In this context, PUFs could provide a cost-effective security mechanism: Authentication based on PUFs can prevent copying and manipulating the information (i.e., the debit of the RFID-based ticket and/or the user's rights) by cryptographically binding this data to the physical characteristics of the underlying RFID chip. Existing PUF-based authentication schemes (see, e.g., [19, 43, 45, 47, 57] ) typically assume each device, i.e., each token T , to be equipped with a PUF, whereas the verifier V maintains a database D, i.e., a set of CRPs of each ticket. In the authentication protocol, V chooses a random challenge from D and sends it to T , which then returns some response. V accepts if the response of T matches the one in D.
Using LR-PUFs instead of non-reconfigurable PUFs would allow for cost-effective, secure and privacy-preserving recycling of RFID-based tickets: By reconfiguring the LR-PUF all information and access rights bound to T are securely "erased", which cannot be achieved with non-reconfigurable PUFs. However, reconfiguring the LR-PUF invalidates the CRP database D of V, which means that after each reconfiguration of T a new CRP database must be established. To counter this problem, V could know the LR-PUF state S of each token and maintain a CRP database D of the PUF underlying the LR-PUF, which can be seen as the "authentication secrets" of the token. This is common in ticketing applications because the verifier typically knows the authentication secrets of all tokens. Since the algorithms of the control unit, i.e., the input and output transition functions mapin() and mapout(), respectively, and the state update algorithm rcnf(), are publicly known, V could use D to recompute the LR-PUF response for any state of T and compare it to the response sent by T . V accepts if the response of T matches the one recomputed based on D and S.
LR-PUF-based RFID-enabled luggage tags
Many airlines have started replacing paper-based tickets with electronic tickets. However, they still print luggage tags, which are increasingly equipped with disposable RFID chips. The purpose of these chips is to ease the tracking of individual luggage in the process of loading. However, RFID-enabled labels could be read out even without visual contact. This may allow several attacks ranging from copying luggage tags to smuggle in additional luggage in the name of another passenger. Moreover, RFID-enabled luggage tags may disclose personal information on their owner (e.g., name, number of luggage pieces and/or luggage weight), which could be used to track the user on the airport or provides useful information to luggage thieves. To solve these problems, travellers could purchase or rent a more powerful LR-PUF-enabled RFID token that is put into the luggage or that could even be embedded into new generations of suitcases. Each time the traveller checks in, his RFID-based tag is reconfigured by the airline attendant, which securely erases the previous information stored on it. This prevents tracking the traveler for more than one flight and impedes misrouting of luggage due to old travel information. Further, to avoid illegitimate tracking of travellers, the RFID-enabled luggage tag after could be reconfigured or temporarily disabled once the passenger leaves the baggage claim area.
Other applications envisaged
One can find many other applications that could take advantage of LR-PUFs. Examples include, secure deletion and/or update of cryptographic secrets in PUF-based key storage [32, 58] and PUF-based cryptographic primitives [3] , where the reconfiguration of the PUF ensures that old secrets cannot be retrieved any more. Another example are solutions to prevent downgrading of software [25] by binding the software to the PUF, where reconfiguring the PUF invalidates the old software version such that only the latest version can be used. A concrete LR-PUF-based instantiation of such a system has been recently presented in [10] .
Conclusion
We presented the concept and formalization of LR-PUFs, which utilize a control logic to enable dynamic reconfigurability for existing, typically static PUFs without physically replacing or modifying them. We introduced two different constructions for LR-PUFs: Our first construction is optimized for response generation speed, while the second one aims for resource-constrained embedded devices, such as, RFID tags. Furthermore, we have shown that both constructions achieve the security properties of backward-and forward unpredictability, which are two desirable properties in the context of PUF-based cryptographic applications such as key storage and device identification. Finally, we showed how LR-PUFs could be applied in the context of recyclable (access) tokens to enhance the security properties of existing solutions while providing a means for secure recycling of PUF-based access tokens. Future work includes the design and implementation of LR-PUF-based security solutions for (privacy-preserving) device authentication and IP protection.
